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Abstract 
We estimate trend UK labour productivity growth using a Hodrick-Prescott filter method.  We use 
the results to compare downturns where the economy fell below its pre-existing trend.  We find that 
the current productivity slowdown has resulted in productivity being 19.7% below the pre-2008 
trend path in 2018.  This is nearly double the previous worst productivity shortfall ten years after the 
start of a downturn.  On this criterion the slowdown is unprecedented in the last 250 years.  We 
conjecture that this reflects a combination of adverse circumstances, namely, a financial crisis, a 
weakening impact of ICT and impending Brexit. 
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. 
1. Introduction 
The weakness of UK productivity growth after 2007 has been much discussed.  The so-called 
‘productivity puzzle’ is captured by the observation that in 2018 quarter 4, real GDP per hour worked 
was only 2.0 per cent above the pre-crisis peak seen in 2007 quarter 4 and was 18.3 per cent lower 
than if pre-crisis trend growth had been sustained (ONS, 2019). Pre-crisis peak labour productivity was 
not surpassed until 2016 quarter 2. 
Not surprisingly, people have looked for a precedent for such a decline in productivity performance. 
This is interesting per se but if a similar episode can be identified this might provide useful insights 
into the current malaise.  There have been significant productivity slowdowns in the past – for 
example, at the end of the mid-Victorian boom in the early 1870s, in the Edwardian ‘climacteric’ at 
the turn of the 20th century, during the ‘great depression’ of the early 1930s, and at the end of the 
European ‘Golden Age’ of rapid catch-up growth in the early 1970s.  At least two of these episodes 
might be thought to have some relevance for today – the Edwardian era, which is sometimes seen as 
a hiatus between general purpose technologies, and the 1930s as a period of severe recession.1  
 
The obvious prior question is whether these previous slowdowns are comparable in terms of the 
shortfall in performance relative to previous expectations.  In this paper we investigate this issue by 
looking at the measure given prominence by ONS: namely, to estimate how much the level of labour 
productivity had fallen below what would have been expected if the previous trend had been 
sustained for the next 10 years.  This analysis is facilitated by the recent publication of a dataset 
(Thomas and Dimsdale, 2017) which provides estimates of labour productivity over the long run on a 
GDP per hour worked basis.  We estimate trend productivity growth by using the Hodrick-Prescott 
(1997) filter to analyse these data. 
 
Our main results are as follows.  First, we find that during the last 150 years trend labour productivity 
growth has varied between 0.9 and 3.3 per cent per year.  In the context of this long run performance, 
pre-crisis trend productivity growth was very respectable at around 2.3 per cent per year, higher than 
at any time except the Golden Age.  Second, our estimate of the shortfall between actual labour 
productivity in 2018 and what would have been expected on the basis of the pre-crisis trend is similar 
to that of ONS at 19.7 per cent.  Third, this shortfall at the 10-year interval far exceeds that of any 
previous productivity slowdown.  The two previous largest negative deviations from previous trend 
are 10.9 per cent ten years after 1971 and 10 per cent ten years after 1883.  Fourth, in the case of 
both the Edwardian climacteric (1898) and the great depression (1929) the shortfall at the 10-year 
mark is much smaller at 5.5 and 5.3 per cent respectively.  Fifth, labour productivity was lower in the 
late 18th century when it averaged -0.13 per cent per year between 1760 and 1800 than it has been 
post 2008 but this did not entail a downward turn from a previous strong trend growth performance. 
 
                                                             
1 For example, in an interview with the Daily Telegraph in 2018 Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor of the Bank 
of England, compared the current state of the economy with the ‘climacteric’, the sharp fall in productivity 
growth during the pause between the age of steam and the age of electricity at the end of the Victorian era 
which was first highlighted by Phelps-Brown and Handfield-Jones (1952). 
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We conclude that the present productivity slowdown can indeed be described as unprecedented and 
this adds to the sense that it is a ‘puzzle’.  We conjecture that it may be the outcome of a novel 
combination of circumstances – a financial crisis plus a hiatus between general purpose technologies 
plus uncertainty associated with a major change in trading arrangements.2 
 
2. Data 
 
Our data are taken from Thomas and Dimsdale (2017). This source is superior to earlier datasets in 
two ways which matter for our analysis.  First, it embodies several important revisions that have 
recently been made to historical estimates of real GDP.  For the period prior to 1855, these are based 
on the study by Broadberry et al. (2015), which provides annual estimates where previously only 
benchmark years were available.  For the period from 1870 to 1948, in line with modern ONS methods, 
the ‘balanced estimates’ made by Sefton and Weale (1995) and Solomou and Weale (1991) are used 
rather than the ‘compromise’ estimate of GDP favoured by Feinstein (1972).  Finally, for the period 
since 1948, current ONS estimates are available which incorporate recent methodological innovations 
affecting the construction of the GDP deflator and the treatment of R&D expenditure.  These changes 
are conveniently summarized in Bank of England (2011) and their effect is to raise the growth rate of 
real GDP compared with previous estimates. 
 
Second, the Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) dataset contains estimates for total hours worked on an 
annual basis from 1856 onwards.  This is an important improvement which permits time-series 
analysis of labour productivity growth in terms of output per hour worked rather than per worker 
during the pre-World War I period.  Given the considerable changes to hours worked after the mid-
19th century this is much preferred and, in particular, it makes a notable difference at the end of the 
mid-Victorian boom.  Prior to 1856 estimates of hours worked are available only for a few benchmark 
years at wide intervals between which there are substantial differences.  Thomas and Dimsdale 
construct an interpolated series which provides the basis for their real GDP per hour worked series for 
earlier years.  We do analyse the pre-1856 data but note that it has to be treated with caution.  
Fortunately, for the years after 1870 the estimated trend rate of labour productivity growth is 
essentially the same whether estimation starts in 1761 or 1856.3   
 
 
3. Computing trends in productivity 
 
The underlying model for obtaining trend productivity growth rates is that of an additive 
decomposition of the logarithm of labour productivity 𝑥𝑡 , which is observed over the years 𝑡 =
1,2, … , 𝑇, into a trend, 𝜇𝑡, and a cycle, 𝜓𝑡, typically assumed to be independent of each other, i.e.,  
 
 𝑥𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜓𝑡  𝐸(𝜇𝑡𝜓𝑠) = 0 for all 𝑡 and 𝑠     (1) 
 
                                                             
2 Uncertainty has adverse effects on investment but also undermines the efficient use of managers’ time which 
is swallowed up by planning for various contingencies. 
3 Our analysis is based on Table A56 Column O of Thomas and Dimsdale (2017).  Ryland Thomas kindly supplied 
an updated version of this page of the spreadsheet which allowed us to extend the analysis to 2018. 
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The actual model used here is one in which the trend follows a random walk 
 𝜇𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑡         (2) 
in which the drift, which is the trend growth rate here, also follows a random walk, albeit without drift,  
 𝛽𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑡          (3) 
The errors 𝑎𝑡 and 𝑏𝑡 are assumed to be independent zero mean white noises with variances 𝜎𝑎
2 and 
𝜎𝑏
2.  The cycle 𝜓𝑡 is also assumed to be white noise with variance 𝜎𝜓
2  and, from the assumption made 
in (3), will be independent of both 𝑎𝑡 and 𝑏𝑡.  Equations (1)-(3) are together known as a structural 
model and their specifications have been chosen to ensure that the trend component could be both 
smooth and slowly evolving.  Furthermore, as we discuss below, it also has the additional benefit of 
having a ready interpretation as a popularly used trend filter.   
 
The model may be fitted by casting equations (1)-(3) into state space form and estimating the 
parameters by employing maximum likelihood via the predictive error decomposition of the Kalman 
filter, with the trend component then being estimated using the Kalman smoother (Mills, 2019, 
chapter 17 provides an introductory discussion of such models).  When the model was fitted to labour 
productivity, it was found that the variance of the error to the trend equation (2), 𝜎𝑎
2, was estimated 
to be both very small and insignificantly different from zero.  Setting this variance to zero produces 
what is known as a ‘smooth trend’ structural model and is equivalent to obtaining the trend using a 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with the smoothing parameter, say 𝜆, set to a very large value (see, for 
example, Mills, 2019, chapter 8).  The trend component of labour productivity was thus computed 
using the HP filter with 𝜆 = 10,000.  This setting does indeed produce a satisfactorily smooth, albeit 
slowly evolving, trend component and readily interpretable trend growth rates, defined as 100∆𝜇𝑡, 
which gives the growth rate in percentages per annum.4   
 
Figure 1 shows the logarithm of labour productivity from 1856 to 2018 with this ‘smooth’ trend 
superimposed.  It is clear that labour productivity from 2008 has diverged substantially from this 
extrapolated growth path and this is also seen in Figure 2, where the growth rates (in % per annum) 
of actual and trend labour productivity are shown. These range from just over 0.9% during the first 
decade of the 20th century to just above 3.3% during the 1960s.  Trend labour productivity growth just 
                                                             
4 The use of a higher value for 𝜆 than is often employed in many applications of the HP filter in macroeconomic 
modelling (for example, setting the smoothing parameter to 100 is common practice when using annual data) 
may also be justified from the theoretical and simulation analyses of Harvey and Trimbur (2008) and Flaig (2015). 
Hamilton (2018) has recently criticised the HP filter, arguing against the widespread use of the filter to extract a 
business cycle component from monthly and quarterly macroeconomic time series.  As we have emphasised, 
our purpose here is to extract a smooth and evolving trend component from annual data.  The structural model 
(1)-(3), with the error variance of the trend component set to zero in accordance with the data, achieves this 
aim, with the correspondence to the HP filter with a large setting of the smoothing parameter providing a helpful 
expository device to aid in the interpretation of the trend component model.  Hamilton (2018) also proposes an 
alternative, ‘robust’, method of estimating the trend component.  This is to use the predicted values, ?̂?𝑡(ℎ), 
from the regression of 𝑥𝑡 on a constant and the lagged values 𝑥𝑡−ℎ , 𝑥𝑡−ℎ−1, 𝑥𝑡−ℎ−2, 𝑥𝑡−ℎ−3  to estimate the trend 
component, so that the trend growth rate is estimated as 100∆?̂?𝑡(ℎ).  For all values of h between 1 and 5 the 
estimated trend growth rates from this regression follow essentially the same pattern as the observed growth 
rates 
4 
 
prior to the great recession was 2.3%.  Figure 3 shows the cumulative divergence from trend growth 
in year t over the next 10 years.  The behaviour of labour productivity since the financial crisis is 
unprecedented, with the divergence in the decade from 2007 being –20.8% and –19.7% from 2008.  
As we remark in the introduction, these declines are twice that of the next steepest decline, -10.9% in 
the decade from 1971, and almost four times the declines seen during the Victorian climacteric and 
the depression of the 1930s. 
 
This exercise was also carried out for the longer period from 1760 although, as noted above, some 
caution should be exercised as the pre-1856 data on labour productivity has been interpolated.  Thus 
Figures 4-6 reproduce Figures 1-3 for the extended period.  For the post-1870 period the results are 
essentially the same.  For the years prior to 1856 we observe very low productivity growth, both actual 
and trend, at the outset followed by a gradual rise to a peak in trend growth at 1.7% in the 1860s.  
Actual productivity growth between 1760 and 1800 averaged -0.13% compared with 0.25% from 2008 
to 2018.  However, Figure 6 shows that the downturn in recent productivity performance continues 
to be unprecedented when the period from the mid-18th to mid-19th century is also included in the 
analysis; since 1760 there is no previous episode where 10 years on productivity was anywhere near 
20 percent below what would have been expected from its previous trend growth. 
4. Discussion 
Our analysis has been carried out using conventional estimates of real GDP as the basis for measuring 
labour productivity.  It has been widely remarked that the rise of the digital economy presents a 
serious challenge to national accounting and thus to traditional labour productivity measurement.  
The issue partly concerns some economic activity moving across the boundary between GDP and 
home production and partly because of new business models in which digital services are not fully 
charged for directly (Coyle, 2017).  Bean (2016) suggests that real GDP growth could have been as 
much as 0.7% per year larger over the period 2005 to 2014 had the impact of the digital economy 
been captured fully.  Even so, the increase in this digital contribution post 2008 was presumably quite 
a lot less than 0.7% since it was already in evidence previously.5  There is widespread agreement 
among economists who have examined the issue for the United States, where the literature is much 
richer, that measurement problems account at most for a small proportion of the productivity 
slowdown Byrne et al., 2016; Syverson, 2017). 
If the productivity slowdown is not primarily a statistical artefact and is unprecedented, what might 
be the explanation for such a dramatic turn of events?  It is fair to say that the answer to this question 
has proved elusive but we can offer a conjecture that a combination of adverse circumstances, itself 
unprecedented, may be responsible for a large part of the evaporation of productivity growth since 
2008.  The unfavourable conditions include the ebbing away of the ICT (information and 
communications technologies) boom, the implications of the financial crisis and, in the recent past, 
impending Brexit. 
ICT is an important general-purpose technology (GPT) which had a substantial impact on UK 
productivity growth around the turn of the century.  Using conventional growth accounting methods, 
                                                             
5 It is highly likely that the national accounts have been underestimating growth for a long time before the 
crisis as well as recently but much less plausible that this has suddenly got worse to the extent needed to 
account for much of the productivity slowdown, see Crafts (2018). 
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the contribution of ICT capital to labour productivity growth averaged 0.82 percentage points per year 
during 1996 to 2007 compared with only 0.19 percentage points during 2008 to 2018 (The Conference 
Board, 2019).  Similarly, the contribution of TFP growth in ICT production fell from 0.23 to 0.04 
percentage points (EU KLEMS, 2017).6  Cumulated over the 10 years from 2008, this implies labour 
productivity in 2018 was about 8.5% lower than if the earlier ICT contribution had been sustained.  
Although a new GPT may be on the horizon in the form of artificial intelligence, this has yet to have a 
significant impact on productivity. 
Banking crises can be expected to have an adverse impact on productive capacity such that the level 
of potential output is permanently reduced compared with a business-as-usual counterfactual. 
Thinking in terms of a production function or growth accounting, there may be direct adverse effects 
on capital inputs as investment is interrupted, on human capital if skills are lost or restructuring makes 
them redundant, on labour inputs through increases in equilibrium unemployment, and on TFP if R&D 
is cut back or innovative firms cannot get finance.  The impact of the UK financial crisis on potential 
output has variously been estimated to be between 3.8 and 7.5 per cent (Crafts, 2019).7  In addition, 
productivity growth in the financial sector itself has been markedly reduced with the implication that 
its contribution to overall labour productivity growth fell by 0.6 per cent per year pre- and-post-crisis 
(Riley et al., 2018).  Thus, the financial crisis may have reduced the level of labour productivity relative 
to the counterfactual of staying on the pre-2008 trend by 10 per cent or more.8 
Brexit is the third unusual shock to have materialised.  Here the relevant aspect is, of course, the short 
run impact since mid-2016 working through channels such as its effect on investment through 
uncertainty, the diversion of top-management time towards Brexit planning and a relative shrinking 
of highly-productive exporters compared with less productive domestically orientated firms.  Using 
evidence from a large survey of UK firms, Bloom et al. (2019) estimate that impending Brexit has 
reduced productivity by between 2 and 5 percent.  An alternative estimate of the Brexit effect is 
provided by Born et al. (2019a) using a synthetic control group methodology which creates a 
‘doppelganger’ economy which is not subjected to the Brexit shock.9  The result is that GDP (and 
presumably labour productivity) was about 2 per cent lower in 2018 than it would have been without 
the vote for Brexit. 
Obviously, this discussion does not provide a precise accounting for the productivity puzzle.  It does, 
however, highlight a marked contrast with previous episodes when downturns from an earlier trend 
productivity growth were observed which some might expect to have been similar but which were, in 
fact, relatively mild.  In neither the Great Depression nor the Edwardian climacteric were the three 
ingredients of a rapidly ebbing GPT, a banking crisis and prolonged uncertainty over trading 
arrangements all present.  Indeed, there is no previous experience in British economic history where 
these three phenomena have occurred in such a short space of time. 
                                                             
6 This comparison is between 1996 to 2007 and 2008 to 2015. 
7 In the short to medium term financial disruption may also give rise to significant resource misallocation and 
thus productivity losses.  Gerth and Otsu (2018) find that this had a big impact on efficiency in the UK through 
2014 but it is not known if this effect persisted through 2018.  Resource misallocation is generally substantial 
in Europe though less severe in the UK than most other countries (Gorodnichenko et al. (2018). 
8 Reduced productivity growth in financial services no doubt partly reflected a lower ICT capital contribution so 
is not entirely additional to the ICT impact already discussed. 
9 The technicalities of the approach are explained in Born et al. (2019b). 
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As we noted earlier, the 10-year difference after 1929 was 5.3% (Figure 3).  The ‘great depression’ 
years look quite different from post-2008 in that there was no UK banking crisis and the impacts of 
GPTs of the time (electricity and the internal combustion engine) were gathering pace rather than 
weakening.10  The move from fixed exchange rate and free trade to cheap money, dirty floating and 
the general tariff on manufactures was completed in less than a year, after which recovery soon 
followed (Crafts, 2013). 
In the case of the Edwardian climacteric, the 10-year difference after 1898 was 5.5% (Figure 3).  The 
steam age was coming to an end and electricity had yet to make a significant impact on productivity 
(Ristuccia and Solomou, 2014).  Growth accounting suggests, however, that the impact of steam 
power on productivity growth extended over a long period of time but never reaching the intensity of 
the peak associated with ICT (Crafts, 2004), with the implication that its waning weighed less heavily 
at the start of the 20th century than that of ICT in the early 21st century.  There was no banking crisis 
during the Edwardian climacteric.  There was, however, a lengthy and bitter controversy over moving 
away from free trade, with Joseph Chamberlain as the leading advocate of tariff reform, which 
culminated in a landslide victory for the (pro-free-trade) Liberal Party in the General Election of 1906. 
5. Conclusions 
Our main conclusion is that the answer to the question posed at the outset is ‘yes’ – the current UK 
productivity slowdown is unprecedented.  We base this finding on the criterion of how far the level of 
productivity is below the path implied by the continuation of earlier trend productivity growth, a 
measure of performance highlighted by ONS in recent times.  We focus on the level reached ten years 
after a slowdown began.  We estimate the shortfall in 2018 to have been 19.7 per cent.  This compares 
with 10.9 per cent ten years after 1971 and 10 per cent ten years after 1883, these being the next 
worst episodes in the 250 years. 
We do not have a fully satisfactory explanation for the productivity slowdown.  Nevertheless, we think 
it is important to recognise that it has occurred in the context of a novel combination of adverse 
circumstances.  These are the coincidence of a banking crisis, the waning impact of a general-purpose 
technology (ICT) and uncertainty about international trading relations (Brexit).  It is plausible that 
together they have comprised a major shock to productivity outcomes. 
  
                                                             
10 Other countries, notably including Germany and the United States, had major banking crises which 
contributed to much more severe downturns than in the UK.  For a list of countries which did have banking 
crises, see Crafts and Fearon (2013, Table 6). 
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Figure 1 Logarithms of labour productivity, 1856 – 2008, with trend superimposed. 
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Figure 2 Labour productivity growth, 1857 – 2018, with trend growth superimposed. 
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Figure 3 Cumulative 10-year ahead difference from trend growth, 1857 – 2008. 
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Figure 4 Logarithms of labour productivity, 1760 – 2008, with trend superimposed. 
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Figure 5 Labour productivity growth, 1761 – 2018, with trend growth superimposed. 
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Figure 6 Cumulative 10-year ahead difference from trend growth, 1761 – 2008. 
 
